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1. What is team reasoning?
2. In what sense does team reasoning give rise to aggregate agents?
3. How might team reasoning be used in constructing a theory of shared agency?
‘The key difference between [individual and shared intentions]
is not a property of the intentions themselves,
but of the modes of reasoning by which they are formed.
Thus, an analysis which starts with the intention
has already missed
what is distinctively collective about it’
(Gold & Sugden, 2007)
two accounts involving team reasoning
Gold & Sugden (2007) --- not covered here
Pacherie (2013)
Pacherie’s ‘shared intention lite’
‘Two persons P1 and P2 share an intention to A, if:
(i) each has a self-conception as a member of the team T, consisting of P1 and P2 (collective self-framing);
(i’) each believes (i) (group identification expectation);
(ii) each reasons that A is the best choice of action for the team (team reasoning from a group viewpoint); and
(iii) each therefore intends to do his part of A (team reasoning from an individual viewpoint).’
Pacherie (2013)
see also Gold & Sugden (2007); Pacherie (2011)
What distinguishes joint action from parallel but merely individual action?
Joint action involves shared intention.
What is shared intention?
Bratman’s planning theory
vs
Pacherie’s team reasoning theory
Which, if either, is correct?
Pacherie
shared intentions are consequences of team reasoning
Bratman
shared intentions are for coordinating planning (&c)
two modes of reasoning
inferential integration
requires team preferences
requires only individual preferences
requires common knowledge of rationality
(or ?)
requires common knowledge of intentions
(or ?)
Pacherie
shared intentions are consequences of team reasoning
Questions
Is team reasoning a feature of every joint action?
two modes of reasoning
2. Are intentions inferentially integrated with shared intentions?
requires team preferences
When, if ever, do teams have preferences?
requires common knowledge of rationality
(or ?)
Who has common knowledge of rationality?
‘Nothing in this account of team agency purports to tell people when they ought---whether morally or rationally---to act as members of teams.’
(Sugden, 2000, p. 195)
Pacherie
shared intentions are consequences of team reasoning
Questions
Is team reasoning a feature of every joint action?
two modes of reasoning
2. Are intentions inferentially integrated with shared intentions?
requires team preferences
When, if ever, do teams have preferences?
requires common knowledge of rationality
(or ?)
Who has common knowledge of rationality?
An individual who engages in team-directed reasoning appraises alternative arrays of actions by members of the team in relation to team-directed preferences’
‘At the level of the team members, a team preference is a team- directed preference which is common to all those members, and which governs the team-directed reasoning of each of them.’
‘At the level of the team, team preference is a ranking of outcomes which is revealed in the team's decisions.’
(Sugden, 2000)
Pacherie
shared intentions are consequences of team reasoning
Questions
Is team reasoning a feature of every joint action?
two modes of reasoning
2. Are intentions inferentially integrated with shared intentions?
requires team preferences
When, if ever, do teams have preferences?
requires common knowledge of rationality
(or ?)
Who has common knowledge of rationality?
What distinguishes joint action from parallel but merely individual action?
Joint action involves shared intention.
What is shared intention?
Bratman’s planning theory
vs
Pacherie’s team reasoning theory
Which, if either, is correct?
‘The key difference between the two kinds of intention is not a property of the intentions themselves, but of the modes of reasoning by which they are formed. Thus, an analysis which starts with the intention has already missed what is distinctively collective about it’
Gold and Sugden (2006)
1. What is team reasoning?
2. In what sense does team reasoning give rise to aggregate agents?
3. How might team reasoning be used in constructing a theory of shared agency?