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‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
Bacharach (2006, p. 121)
| Player X | |||
| high | low | ||
| Player Y | high | 2 2 | 0 0 |
| low | 0 0 | 1 1 | |
What should X do?
Game theory:
If X expects Y to choose high, X should choose high
If X expects Y to choose low, X should choose low
What X expects depends on what Y expects X to do ...
... -> X has no reason to prefer high over low.
Team reasoning:
...
hi-lo situations are pervasive in everyday life
(Bacharach, 2006, p. Chapter 1.1)
‘It seems quite obvious that you should choose [high].
However, the question is why it seems obvious,
and [...] why people almost always do choose [high].
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 35)
[...] The answer I shall offer has far-reaching implications for [...] our conception of ourselves as social beings.’
‘it seems obvious that ‘high’ is the rational choice [...]. Apparently, something is missing from the standard theory of rational choice. But what?’
(Sugden, 2000, p. 182)
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
Bacharach (2006, p. 121)
‘[A] team exists to the extent that its members take themselves to be members of it.
[T]o take oneself to be a member of a team is to engage in such reasoning oneself, while holding certain beliefs about the use of such reasoning by others’
Sugden (2000)
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
Bacharach (2006, p. 121)
best = maximises expected utility, but ...
| game theory | team reasoning | |
| what is appraised? | my actions | sets of our actions |
| what is the standard of appraisal? | my preferences | team-directed preferences |
‘At the level of the team, team preference is a ranking of outcomes which is revealed in the team's decisions.’
(Sugden, 2000)
team reasoning requires that
not only individuals but also
teams have preferences (?!)
‘her conception of [...] her agency undergoes a transformation.[...] she undergoes [...] 'agency transformation': she thinks of her agential self—her doing and causing self—as a component part of [the team’s] agency.’ (Bacharach, 2006)
relevance to the ‘hi-lo’ questions?
| Player X | |||
| high | low | ||
| Player Y | high | 2 2 | 0 0 |
| low | 0 0 | 1 1 | |
‘One of the salient features of [team] reasoning is that it generates recommendations for action that are not conditional on the actor's beliefs about what the other individuals will do.
‘In this respect, team-directed reasoning is quite different from the strategic reasoning that is modelled in conventional game theory.’
(Sugden, 2000, p. 191)
| Player X | |||
| high | low | ||
| Player Y | high | 2 2 | 0 0 |
| low | 0 0 | 1 1 | |
What does team reasoning predict?
– depends on who is in a team
– depends on team-directed preferences
(which need not be a function of individual preferences)
– depends on how the situation is framed
Sugden: autonomy
Team preferences ‘are not necessarily reducible to, or capable of being constructed out of,’ individual preferences
‘There is ... nothing inherently inconsistent in the possibility that every member of the group has an individual preference for y over x (say, each prefers wine bars to pubs) while the group acts on an objective that ranks x above y.’
(Sugden, 2000)
Bacharach: constraints
‘in a lifeboat the group objective is just everyone's objective--that the boat reach land as quickly as possible. In cases of perfect harmony of common interest, the shared ranking of outcomes is also the group ranking.’ (Bacharach, 2006)
Paretianness: roughly, if it’s weakly better for each it’s better for the team.
relevance to prisoners’ dilemma?
| Prisoner X | |||
| resist | confess | ||
| Prisoner 59640 | resist | 3 3 | 0 4 |
| confess | 4 0 | 1 1 | |
What does team reasoning predict?
There are multiple versions of team reasoning, which differ üa on whether individual preferences constrain team preferences.
This matters when you say what team reasoning predicts.
Bacharach and Sugden make different claims about the relation of individual to team preferences.
short essay question:
What is team reasoning?
Which, if any, social interactions are better modeled by team reasoning than game theory?
plan
1. What is game theory? ✓
1a. What are its applications? ✓
2. What are some limits on its applications? ✓
3. What is team reasoning and how might it overcome the limits? ✓