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Here’s a preview. I will explain it later.
 
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 121)
 
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\subsection{slide-18}
COmpare Sugden
 

‘it seems obvious that ‘high’ is the rational choice [...]. Apparently, something is missing from the standard theory of rational choice. But what?’

(Sugden, 2000, p. 182)

 
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\subsection{slide-19}
To repeat ...
 
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 121)
 
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\subsection{slide-20}
We need some kind of identification
 
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\subsection{slide-21}
‘[A] team exists to the extent that its members take themselves to be members of it.
(Sugden, 2000)
 
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\subsection{slide-22}
[T]o take oneself to be a member of a team is to engage in such reasoning oneself, while holding certain beliefs about the use of such reasoning by others’
(Sugden, 2000)
 
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\subsection{slide-23}
What counts as best possible?
--------
\subsection{slide-25}
(Sugden, 2000)
 
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\subsection{slide-27}
Preferences of teams just like preferences of the individuals. (Team really is considered as an aggregate agent.)
 
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\subsection{slide-32}
You do not always team reason even with members of your team
 
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\subsection{slide-33}
[mention autonomy now but not aggregate agents yet!] It is important to recognise that we have autonomous aggregate subjects because ...
 

‘There is ... nothing inherently inconsistent in the possibility that every member of the group has an individual preference for y over x (say, each prefers wine bars to pubs) while the group acts on an objective that ranks x above y.’

(Sugden, 2000)
 
--------
\subsection{slide-34}
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 121)
 
We need some kind of identification
 
‘[A] team exists to the extent that its members take themselves to be members of it.
(Sugden, 2000)
 
[T]o take oneself to be a member of a team is to engage in such reasoning oneself, while holding certain beliefs about the use of such reasoning by others’
(Sugden, 2000)
 
I asked, What counts as best possible? Now we have answered that question (in best posible -> max expected utility relative to team preferences)
 
--------
\subsection{slide-36}
q1 Why does hi seem obvious?
 
q2 Why do pepole almost always choose hi?
 
--------
\subsection{slide-37}
So how is this solved by team reasoning? (Later: if we agree with Sugden about ‘autonomy’, then maybe it isn’t.)
 
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\subsection{slide-42}
What does team reasoning predict?
 
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 121)
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 121)
 
‘[A] team exists to the extent that its members take themselves to be members of it.
(Sugden, 2000)
 
[T]o take oneself to be a member of a team is to engage in such reasoning oneself, while holding certain beliefs about the use of such reasoning by others’
(Sugden, 2000)
(Sugden, 2000)
 

‘There is ... nothing inherently inconsistent in the possibility that every member of the group has an individual preference for y over x (say, each prefers wine bars to pubs) while the group acts on an objective that ranks x above y.’

(Sugden, 2000)
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 121)
 
‘[A] team exists to the extent that its members take themselves to be members of it.
(Sugden, 2000)
 
[T]o take oneself to be a member of a team is to engage in such reasoning oneself, while holding certain beliefs about the use of such reasoning by others’
(Sugden, 2000)
 

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