Motor Representation and The Problem of Action

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Motor Representation and The Problem of Action

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

It seems reasonable to expect that any framework that supports theorising about action in the behavioural and social sciences must say something about The Problem of Action. So while solving this problem is not sufficient for our aims, doing so might seem to be necessary. Also a focus for philosophy of action.

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Observation: the Alternative Solution is not obviously in any way worse than the Standard Solution.

This brings me to a second objection ...

Objection 1

habitual processes

Some actions run counter to any of the agent’s intentions because they are dominated by habitual processes.

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

Difference matters because it entails that the objections are complementary in the sense that different strategies are probably needed to reply to them.

discoveries matter for philosophy of action

But now let’s think about responses to this objection

response 1

the Standad Solution is not the only solution

response 2

identify considerations favouring the Standard Solution

actions are done for reasons

Obstacle here is that this is true of all instrumental actions. The notion of being done for a reason would need much further specification in order to make it robustly require intentions if intentions are states that cause actions.

Will probably need to invoke the notion of a reason that an agent has, or the restriction that the reasons are considerations that the agent recognises as favouring the action.

Now the problem is that many things that appear to be actions do not seem to involve any such things.

In developing a response along these lines, it is important not to change the question by switching The Problem of Action for an alternative. (It’s almost trivial that there is some question to which the Standard Solution is the correct answer; our concern, of course, is with whether it is the correct answer to The Problem of Action.)

OK, I’ll leave you with the objection ...

Nothing to say here

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

It seems reasonable to expect that any framework that supports theorising about action in the behavioural and social sciences must say something about The Problem of Action. So while solving this problem is not sufficient for our aims, doing so might seem to be necessary. Also a focus for philosophy of action.

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Observation: the Alternative Solution is not obviously in any way worse than the Standard Solution.

This brings me to a second objection ...

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

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Motor Representation and The Problem of Action

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