Question Session 08

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Question Session 08

this is being recorded

Alex

When it comes to the autonomy dillema, is it really the case that autonomy leads to aggregate subjects being a rare phenomena?

If so, is it influenced by an assumption that humans are more (as) likely to work for their own benefits than (as) for a groups' benefit? No!

Could one argue that a human in general is more likely to engage in team reasoning as a result of developing as a species a preference of group cooperation?

How?

aggregate subject

autonomy

‘There is ... nothing inherently inconsistent in the possibility that every member of the group has an individual preference for y over x (say, each prefers wine bars to pubs) while the group acts on an objective that ranks x above y.’

(Sugden, 2000)

dilemma

autonomy -> rare for team reasoning to occur because axioms

If you have preferences, you satisfy the axioms.

you not satisfy the axioms does not imply that you preferences are irrational: it implies that you do not have preferences at all.

Using Steele & Stefánsson (2020, p. §2.3) here.

transitivity

For any A, B, C ∈ S: if A⪯B and B⪯C then A⪯C.

(Steele & Stefánsson, 2020)

completeness

For any A, B ∈ S: either A⪯B or B⪯A

continuity

‘Continuity implies that no outcome is so bad that you would not be willing to take some gamble that might result in you ending up with that outcome [...] provided that the chance of the bad outcome is small enough.’

Suppose A⪯B⪯C. Then there is a p∈[0,1] such that: {pA, (1 − p)C} ∼ B (Steele & Stefánsson, 2020)

independence

roughly, if you prefer A to B then you should prefer A and C to B and C.

Suppose A⪯B. Then for any C, and any p∈[0,1]: {pA,(1−p)C}⪯{pB,(1−p)C}

Steele & Stefánsson (2020, p. §2.3)

For an aggregate agent comprising me and you to reliably satisfy these axioms

- we must agree on what its preferences are

- we must nonaccidentally coincide on when each of us is when each of us is acting as part of the aggregate (rather than individually)

- whenever any of us unilaterally attempts to influence what its preferences are by acting, we must succeed in doing so

- ...

Seems to require something like institutional structure. Head of department just says how things are.

But you will often get people going a bit off-script.

Alex

When it comes to the autonomy dillema, is it really the case that autonomy leads to aggregate subjects being a rare phenomena?

If so, is it influenced by an assumption that humans are more (as) likely to work for their own benefits than (as) for a groups' benefit? No!

Could one argue that a human in general is more likely to engage in team reasoning as a result of developing as a species a preference of group cooperation?

autonomy

‘There is ... nothing inherently inconsistent in the possibility that every member of the group has an individual preference for y over x (say, each prefers wine bars to pubs) while the group acts on an objective that ranks x above y.’

(Sugden, 2000)

dilemma

autonomy -> rare for team reasoning to occur because axioms

no autonomy -> no aggregate subject after all (just cooperative games)

We specified at the start that our theory concerned only games in which it was not possible to make an enforceable agreement in advance of playing.

Alex

When it comes to the autonomy dillema, is it really the case that autonomy leads to aggregate subjects being a rare phenomena?

If so, is it influenced by an assumption that humans are more (as) likely to work for their own benefits than (as) for a groups' benefit? No!

Could one argue that a human in general is more likely to engage in team reasoning as a result of developing as a species a preference of group cooperation?

Chimpanzees on a plane, none get off.

big change thought to have come about due to pressures towards group living

‘There have been two revolutions in human social life [...].

The first is the transition from great ape social lives to those of the egalitarian foraging bands of the mid- to late-Pleistocene. [...] The transition from great ape to forager social life took millions of years. [...]

Around 10 kya, at the Pleistocene–Holocene transition, a second social revolution began, with the transition to farming and to a sedentary society,’

(Sterelny, 2016)

Alex

When it comes to the autonomy dillema, is it really the case that autonomy leads to aggregate subjects being a rare phenomena?

If so, is it influenced by an assumption that humans are more (as) likely to work for their own benefits than (as) for a groups' benefit? No!

Could one argue that a human in general is more likely to engage in team reasoning as a result of developing as a species a preference of group cooperation?

- Sterelny (2016)

First part looks beyond doubt (Chimps extremely unlikely to be team reasoners, I guess)

Second part ... well,

That depends on what cooperation is I suppose

1

a ‘cooperator is someone who pays a cost, c, for another individual to receive a benefit, b’
(Nowak 2006, p. 1560).

2

‘[b]y cooperation we mean engaging with others in a mutually beneficial activity’ (Bowles & Gintis 2011, p. 2)

This second notion of cooperation has been elaborated by McMahon and others.

I’m tempted to think that the former is merely helping rather than cooperation, but this is not the consensus in the literature. For example, Michael Tomasello explicitly recognises both definitions. In his view they capture ‘two basic forms’ of cooperation

‘Cooperation appears in nature in two basic forms’ (Tomasello)

What are the different candidate notions of cooperation?

In which explanations do any of these notions of cooperation feature ?

(example: Sterelny, 2016)

How, if at all, does team reasoning link to any of these notions of cooperation?

Alex

When it comes to the autonomy dillema, is it really the case that autonomy leads to aggregate subjects being a rare phenomena?

If so, is it influenced by an assumption that humans are more (as) likely to work for their own benefits than (as) for a groups' benefit? No!

Could one argue that a human in general is more likely to engage in team reasoning as a result of developing as a species a preference of group cooperation?

- Sterelny (2016)

long essay topics

https://philosophical-issues-in-behavioural-science.butterfill.com/pdf/essay_questions.pdf

‘What is an interface problem?

Consider one case in which an interface problem arises.

How could the problem be solved?’

One option would be to search for novel cases where there is an interface problem. This is relatively hard. There is a reference to Jackendof on ‘The architecture of the linguistic-spatial interface’. Not sure what you would read, you are very much on your own.

So let’s say that you go with the motor-intention interface problem.

Here there is lecture material on the solution to. Suppose you do very standard things, following the lectrue material, and do it will. What more could you do?

‘What is an interface problem?

one case in which an interface problem arises.

could the problem be solved?’

‘What is an interface problem?

one case in which an interface problem arises.

could the problem be solved?’

another question

How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of acting together incorporate scientific discoveries about the interpersonal coordination of action?

What are the aims of a philosophical theory of acting together?

We saw two possible questions (What distinguishes joint from parallel? and What ground collective directedness). Maybe there are others.

What are some of the discoveries?

option 1: Say how have some researchers claimed they are relevant. Why are those researchers wrong?

Actually do not have much useful literature that will help with this.

option 2: Introduce a philosophical theory with these aims (e.g. Bratman’s) and explain how the discoveries are relevant to it. What are the implications?

This lends itself nicely to considering either team reasoning (if economics is a science) or motor representation.

The questions are encouraging you to focus on just one pair; that is, on one side of the triangle. (Not joining all three nodes.)

Why mix the three (philosophical, psychological and formal)?

what are the methods available to you or to me as philosophers?

philosophical
methods

informally observing,

guessing (‘intuition’),

imagining counterfactual situations
(‘thought experiments’),

reasoning,

& pursuing theoretical elegance

INTENTION	yes	no
Is it a mental state?	Davidson (1978)	Thompson (2008)
Is it a belief?	Velleman (1989)	Bratman (1987)
Entails belief?	Harman (1976)	Levy (2018)
Linked to planning?	(Bratman, 1985)
Incompatible with habitual?		Kalis & Ometto (2021)
Entails non-observational knowledge	Anscombe (1957)
Comes in two kinds?	Searle (1983)	Brozzo (2021)

Philosophical Folk Psychology

‘epistemic case intuitions are generated by [...] folk psychology’

Nagel (2012, p. 510)

As philosophers see
folk psychology ...

‘When someone is in so-and-so combination of mental states and receives sensory stimuli of so-and-so kind, he tends with so-and-so probability to be caused thereby to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so motor responses.’

(Lewis, 1972, p. 256)

Is

folk psychology

a source of common knowledge of principles

that implicitly define ‘intention’, ‘knowledge’, and the rest

?

Lewis (1972) vs Heider (1958)

How about just picking a theory? Or perhaps even taking several and considering, for each, the hypothesis that this is how the folk understand knowledge.

Actually this is sometimes the right thing to do. But there are two obstacles.

Two obstacles

- many incompatible theories, each only slightly different from nearby alterantives

- differences hard to operationalize

Philosophical accounts of minds and actions ...

... anchor a shared understanding of what intention, preference, belief, and the rest are.

... could be (mis)used to characterise various models of mind.

Will in fact exploit this idea later.

Question Session 08

Week 08 Questions:

Philosophical Issues in Behavioural Science

[email protected]

Keyboard Shortcuts?f

Question Session 08

Week 08 Questions:

Philosophical Issues in Behavioural Science

[email protected]

Keyboard Shortcuts`?f`