Keyboard Shortcuts?f

×
  • →Next step
  • ←Previous step
  • ↓Skip this slide
  • ↑Previous slide
  • mShow slide thumbnails
  • nShow notes
  • hShow handout latex source
  • NShow talk notes latex source

Click here and press the right key for the next slide.

(This may not work on mobile or ipad. You can try using chrome or firefox, but even that may fail. Sorry.)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

 

Question Session 03

 

Week 03 Questions:

Philosophical Issues in Behavioural Science

this is being recorded

Jasmine(?) q.1 (asked last week)

Why do we need intentions at all? Why not just beliefs and desires?

Looks like the intention is a kind of redundant intermediary. So why postulate one?
Davidsion: action might never occur.
Bratman’s observation: this is still not satisfactory because ‘Future intentions are, rather, mere spin-offs of practical reasoning concerning the future.’ (Bratman, 1985, p. \ 222)
Full quote: ‘the basic inputs for practical reasoning about what to do---either now or later---will just be the agent's desires and beliefs. Such reasoning, when concerned with the future, can issue in future intentions. And these intentions are fundamentally different sorts of states from the desires and beliefs on which they are based. But there is no significant further role for these intentions to play as inputs into one's further practical thinking. Future intentions are, rather, mere spin-offs of practical reasoning concerning the future.’ (Bratman, 1985, p. \ 222)
Is postulating intention redundant?

Jasmine q.2

Could intention just be an illusion?

To satisfy our need to be in control of our lives?

Couldn't all our actions be habitual?

What if we devalue the food?

Habitual process : it will have no effect on lever pressing

‘Goal-directed’ process : it will reduce lever pressing (to none)

‘the laboratory rat fits the teleological [goal-directed] model’

(Dickinson, 1985, p. 72)

Dickinson, 1985 p. 72

Jasmine q.2

Could intention just be an illusion?

To satisfy our need to be in control of our lives?

Couldn't all our actions be habitual?

Tiago : background

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

It seems reasonable to expect that any framework that supports theorising about action in the behavioural and social sciences must say something about The Problem of Action. So while solving this problem is not sufficient for our aims, doing so might seem to be necessary. Also a focus for philosophy of action.

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Observation: the Alternative Solution is not obviously in any way worse than the Standard Solution.
This brings me to a second objection ...

Objection 1

habitual processes

Some actions run counter to any of the agent’s intentions because they are dominated by habitual processes.

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

Tiago

Does the Alternative Solution evade the objection from habitual processes that threatens the standard solution?

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Objection 1

habitual processes

Some actions run counter to any of the agent’s intentions because they are dominated by habitual processes.

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

cinema setting (stimulus) -- eat popcorn (action)

intention: skip popcorn tonight

(Neal et al., 2011)

The action does not run counter to motor representations!

aside : what about basic actions and intentions ?

Jasmin’s point about needing a reason to postulate intention kicks in here: since we can already explain guidance with motor representation, which we need anyway, there is no further need to postulate an intention. (But this does show how Objection 1 actually depends on the motor discoveries.)

Tiago

Does the Alternative Solution evade the objection from habitual processes that threatens the standard solution?

Or, in other words, does the alternative solution have any problem accommodating the influence of habitual processes (as the standard solution does)?

If not, does this not make the Alternative Solution a better response to the problem of action?

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Objection 3

???

Is there an objection to the alterantive solution?

Alex (github:xandir) : background - mechanistically neutral

1. What distinguishes instrumental actions from things which merely happen to an agent (and from noninstrumental actions, if there are any)?

(‘The Problem of Action’; Frankfurt, 1978; Davidson, 1971)

2. Which states cause instrumental actions?

Standard Solution - mechanistically committed

Alternative Solution :actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Xandir

Are motor representations mechanistically neutral? Or at least less mechanistically dependant compared to intentions

Alex (github:xandir) : background - mechanistically neutral

1. What distinguishes instrumental actions from things which merely happen to an agent (and from noninstrumental actions, if there are any)?

(‘The Problem of Action’; Frankfurt, 1978; Davidson, 1971)

2. Which states cause instrumental actions?

Standard Solution - mechanistically committed

- mechanistically neutral

Alternative Solution : actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Simple Theory

Actions are those events which happen in order to bring outcomes about.

Alex (github:Xandir)

Are motor representations mechanistically neutral? Or at least less mechanistically dependant compared to intentions

What effect does [the ‘Alternative Solution’] have on our understanding of agents?

Would it be possible to misattribute agency to beings we do not consider to be agents?

Compare: ‘an advanced robot capable of replicating my behaviour to a high enough degree might be mistaken for me’

Is that a problem for mechanistically committed accounts?

Jan - background

Anscombian position

  1. An intentional action is one that can be explained in terms of reason
  2. We are aware of it, without any observations

Jan - background

Anscombian position

‘when S is doing A intentionally, S knows that she is doing A.

What is more, acting for a reason, in a sense that contrasts with mere purposive behavior (of the sort characteristic of other animals), essentially involves such knowledge: in acting for a reason, I know an explanation of what I am doing that cites that reason, and therefore know that I am doing it.

That is why, for Anscombe, the question ‘Why?’ is ‘given application’ by the agent. Intentional action turns on knowing the answer to that question.’

(Setiya, 2014)

Jan

Building on Kalis & Ometto (2021), would it not make sense [...] that [...] motor representations are clearly linked to intentions and that [actions guided by motor representations] are merely expresions of them?

Actions guided by ‘motor representations are naturally [...] explained in terms of reason -’

I am reaching for an egg with intention to break it differently, than if I was to merely move it and so on.

We are also aware of them without observations, however this awareness might not be very explicit.

So [1] they do stand in a certain relationship with intention, and therefore [2] the Alternative Solution can be rendered as a Standard one with an extra step.

Yes, reasons. Awareness of those reasons? Maybe not.
Jan’s point relates to Tiago’s: if Jan is right, the Alternative Solution is even more attractive.
But if being guided by motor representations means that your actoins are explained by reasons you are unaware of, then the Alternative Solution seems to conflict with an Anscombian perspective.

Tiago

Does the alternative solution evade the objection from habitual processes that threatens the standard solution?

Or, in other words, does the alternative solution have any problem accommodating the influence of habitual processes (as the standard solution does)?

If not, does this not make the alternative solution a better response to the problem of action?

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Tiago:

It avoids Objection 1 (habitual processes)

Jan(?):

It’s compatible with an Anscombian View

Alex(?):

But it’s mechanistically committed, so not genuinely Anscombian.

The moral, surprisingly, is that if we want to take discoveries in the behavioural sciences seriously, we might want to reject not only the Standard Solution but also the Causal Theory more generally and instead to consider a broadly Anscombian position.

T+J+J+A:

if we want to take discoveries in the behavioural sciences seriously,

we might want to

reject not only the Standard Solution

but also the Causal Theory more generally

and instead to

consider a broadly

Anscombian position.

more questions?