Keyboard Shortcuts?f

×
  • Next step
  • Previous step
  • Skip this slide
  • Previous slide
  • mShow slide thumbnails
  • tShow transcript (+SHIFT = all transcript)
  • nShow notes (+SHIFT = all notes)

Please be cautious in using the transcripts.

They were created mechanically and have mostly not been checked or revised.

Here is how they were created:

  1. live lecture recorded;
  2. machine transcription of live recording;
  3. ask LLM to clean up transcript, and link to individual slides.

This is an error-prone process.

Click here and press the right key for the next slide.

(This may not work on mobile or ipad. You can try using chrome or firefox, but even that may fail. Sorry.)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

 

Salomone-Sehr’s Minimalist Account of Joint Action

Introduce Salomone-Sehr’s minimalist account of shared agency. Aim: evaluate whether it can solve The Problem of Joint Action without shared intention.

Salomone-Sehr’s Minimalist Account

I. Desiderata

1. It must distinguish joint action from mere multi-agent causation.

2. It must account for the ‘common practical orientation’ that unifies the constituent actions.

What is a common practical orientation? It’s hard to say based on the text. (I am not convinced that this is a genuinely independent desideratum, although it is numbered as the second of three in the text.)
‘adequate theories of shared agency must account for the fact that if $\varphi$ is a shared activity, then there must be some common practical orientation that its constituent individual activities all follow.10 An individual activity is not a mere jumble of disconnected bodily movements; rather, it evinces some unified practical orientation. Similarly, a shared activity is not a mere jumble of disconnected individual activities: it, too, evinces some unified practical orientation.’

3. It must ensure this orientation is followed non-coincidentally.

Introduce Salomone-Sehr’s minimalist account of shared agency. Aim: evaluate whether it can solve The Problem of Joint Action without shared intention.

Salomone-Sehr’s Minimalist Account

II. Nec. and Suffic. Conditions

1. Each person’s activities conform to a common plan.

2. This ‘common plan figures in an explanation of our joint conformity to it’.

(Salomone-Sehr, 2024)

Salomone-Sehr’s does fine with this countexample to the Simple Theory. Why? Because there is no common plan which explains joint conformity.
(I suspect we could modify the situation so that there was one, but it seems clearer to use the Hiring Pipeline case below.)

Salomone-Sehr’s Minimalist Account

II. Nec. and Suffic. Conditions

1. Each person’s activities conform to a common plan.

2. This ‘common plan figures in an explanation of our joint conformity to it’.

(Salomone-Sehr, 2024)

Salomone-Sehr’s Minimalist Account

II. Nec. and Suffic. Conditions

1. Each person’s activities conform to a common plan.

2. This ‘common plan figures in an explanation of our joint conformity to it’.

(Salomone-Sehr, 2024)

A Contrast Case

The Surgical Team (Paradigm Case)

A surgical team performs a complex heart operation following a surgical plan ...

A surgical team (surgeon, anesthesiologist, nurses) performs a complex heart operation. They follow a detailed surgical plan, communicate constantly, and adjust their actions in response to one another and the patient's condition. Their roles are distinct but interlocking, and they share the explicit intention to save the patient's life by completing *this* procedure *together*. This is a clear, intentional, and cooperative instance of shared agency.

The Hiring Pipeline (Contrast Case)

A corporation implements a "Culture Fit Initiative," an official, written hiring plan. Its stated goal is to "ensure new hires integrate smoothly and preserve the company's successful 'secret sauce'." 1. **Stage 1 (HR Screener):** The screener uses software that automatically scores and filters resumes based on proxies for cultural similarity—such as alma mater, previous employers, and even listed hobbies. Their performance is measured by how quickly they pass along high-scoring candidates. 2. **Stage 2 (Hiring Manager):** The hiring manager receives this pre-filtered, high-"fit" pool. They must use a mandatory interview rubric that heavily weights these same "fit" criteria. Deviating is costly: advancing a low-scoring candidate requires special justification and negatively impacts the manager's performance review. Neither the screener nor the manager intends to discriminate by race or gender. They are both diligently following the *official plan* to maximize "Culture Fit." Their actions are tightly and non-deviantly coordinated by this plan's artifacts (the software, the rubric, the performance metrics) to produce a systematically homogenous workforce.
* The actions (`A`) are: filtering and interviewing.
* The purpose (`G2`) is not a stated goal but a *selected-effect function*: the reproduction of workforce homogeneity. The specific artifacts—the algorithm and the rubric—were not selected for at random; they persist because they are effective at achieving this systemic outcome, which stabilizes the existing corporate culture.
* This systemic plan (`P2`) explains the agents’ joint conformity. The reason their actions are so reliably coupled to produce *this specific outcome* is that the coordinating mechanisms are functionally organized to do so. The homogeneity is not an accidental byproduct, like a dance alerting a prowler; it is the functional point of the coordinating structure itself.
(Of course there are probably other goals in this situation, eg to hire competent employees. But the point is that the conditions proposed as sufficient can be met by a tuple without a common practical orientation concerning that G)

plan: cultural fit initiative

stage 1: HR officer screens for ‘cultural similarity’ to ensure smooth integration

stage 2: hiring manager gets screened candidates, applies interview rubric to measure fit.

✔ common orientation

✘ common orientation

1. conform to a common plan

2. the plan explains joint conformity

But why is this a problem?

"adequate theories of shared agency must account for the fact that if [something] is a shared activity, then there must be some common practical orientation"

"this analysis captures the fact that constituent individual activities of a shared activity follow a common practical orientation."

Question

What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

Salomone-Sehr’s Minimalist Account ✘

Joint actions are actions with two or more agents ✘

Joint actions are events with two or more agents ✘

insert-transcript#2233f3af-6cdf-4fbb-af85-b94eabba6a84-here

short essay question:

Why, if at all, do we need a theory of shared intention?

(Will be a while before this question makes sense.)

plan d’attaque

premise: Shared intention can only be understood as the solution to a problem.

1. What is the Problem of Joint Action?

2. Can we solve the Problem without shared intention?

3. If we do need shared intention, what is the best account available?

I want to take you through how to write the essay one more time. (Note that the final part of this lecture is not necessary for that!)

short essay question:

Why, if at all, do we need a theory of shared intention?

possible argument

1. The Problem of Joint Action is a genuine problem.

2. We need a theory of shared intention only if the Problem cannot be solved without one.

EITHER
3. I will argue that Position X solves the problem without shared intention.
OR
3.′ Although Position X, which does not involve shared intention, appears to be good solution to the problem, I will object that it does not succeed.

It’s not too hard to give an ok answer to this question, demonstrating knowledge and understanding
It’s hard to give a really good answer to this question, which would require going beyond the lecture notes. One of the problems is that nearly all the literature just assumes that shared intention is necessary.
On the other hand, this is a question that allows you to stay in the philosophy part of the course.

!

My reconstruction: if the account is correct, we do not need shared intention.

What Salomone-Sehr (2024) actually says: there is a counterexample to the claim that joint action requires shared intention (given before the account).

I did not cover it because I do not find the argument very convincing, but it would be worth evaluating it properly.