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The Objection from Contralateral Commitment

background : committment

personal commitment (by me, of me, to me)

contralateral commitment (by me, of me, to you)

‘If they are walking together, both Andrea herself and Heinrich will have the understandings [that]: by virtue of their walking together Andrea has a right to Heinrich’s continued walking alongside her, together with the standing to issue related rebukes and demands.’

(Gilbert, 2013, p. 25)

‘it is unclear how one’s own intention to pursue a goal amounts to a commitment to anyone besides oneself.’

(Roth, 2004, p. 371)

To see this, consider the mafia case and related cases.

1. Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments.

2. Having the intentions specified by Bratman’s Account would not entail having contralateral commitments.

3 An account of shared intention must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.

4. Therefore, Bratman’s Account is at best incomplete.

Bratman’s Account

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

‘When people regard themselves as collectively intending to do something, they appear to understand that, by virtue of the collective intention, and that alone, each party has the standing to demand [...] conformity of the other parties. A joint commitment account [...] respects this fact. [...] accounts that do not appeal to joint commitment—such as those of Michael Bratman and John Searle—are hard-pressed to do so.’

(Gilbert, 2013, pp. 88–89)

These are the conditions that we have been discussing.
Why aren’t we offering a stronger conclusion?
Because the first premise is so weak. If we strengthen premise 1 to say that having shared intentions entails having contralateral commitments, then we would have a stronger argument. Except that it would be harder to defend premise 1.
Suppose the commitment objection works. What should we do? Gilbert proposes an account based on her notion of joint commitment

‘joint commitment underlies a host of central social phenomena in the human realm’;

(Gilbert, 2013, p. 400)

it is a ‘precondition of the correct ascription’ of acting together, collective belief, shared intention, and more’

(Gilbert, 2013, p. 9)

Won’t say what that is here, you have to read book

1. Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments.

2. Having the intentions specified by Bratman’s Account would not entail having contralateral commitments.

3 An account of shared intention must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.

4. Therefore, Bratman’s Account is at best incomplete.

Bratman’s Account

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

‘When people regard themselves as collectively intending to do something, they appear to understand that, by virtue of the collective intention, and that alone, each party has the standing to demand [...] conformity of the other parties. A joint commitment account [...] respects this fact. [...] accounts that do not appeal to joint commitment—such as those of Michael Bratman and John Searle—are hard-pressed to do so.’

(Gilbert, 2013, pp. 88–89)

What does gilbert say in favour of this?
This is not an argument. Never do this in your essays. Either they can or they cannot. Also note that the subject is an account. A person might be hard pressed to do something; an account cannot be.
Stress ‘by virtue of the collective intention, and that alone’ in this quote.
Consider Bratman’s argument against this second premise ...

Bratman: ‘Shared intention, social explanation’

The gist of Bratman’s repsonse is this. Yes: Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments. But: the association can be explained by factors extraneous to shared agency.
Let’s see how this explanation goes ...
Note that what follows isn’t exactly what Bratman says; I’m borrowing his ideas to respond to what I think might be a good argument from commitment against the Simple View and, as we’ll see, against Bratman’s view.

If I assure you of something, or intentionally encourage you to rely on it, then you are in a special position to criticise me.

The association of shared intention with contralateral commitments is a consequence of the fact that shared intentions are often sustained by assurance and suchlike.

Specifically, the interdependence of persistence may depend on commitments or commitment generating things.
This would be a great essay topic: read Gilbert plus Roth (2004) on Scanlon plus Chapter 4 of Bratman’s book and try to work out who is right.
So if you accept Bratman’s view, do you think contralateral commitments are just irrelevant in giving an account of shared agency? Not at all because ..

Contralateral commitments sometimes enable us to have shared intentions.

1. Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments.

2. Having the intentions specified by Bratman’s Account would not entail having contralateral commitments.

3 An account of shared intention must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.

4. Therefore, Bratman’s Account is at best incomplete.

‘When people regard themselves as collectively intending to do something, they appear to understand that, by virtue of the collective intention, and that alone, each party has the standing to demand [...] conformity of the other parties. A joint commitment account [...] respects this fact. [...] accounts that do not appeal to joint commitment—such as those of Michael Bratman and John Searle—are hard-pressed to do so.’

(Gilbert, 2013, pp. 88–89)

Bratman’s reply makes this hard to hold on to.

How is contralateral commitment associated with shared intention?

Bratman: it’s extrinsic

Gilbert (and others): it’s intrinsic

Not all shared intention involves contralateral commitment.

All shared intention involves contralateral commitment.

The existence of contralateral commitments can be explained by general ethical and social facts.

The existence of contralateral commitments cannot be explained by general ethical and social facts.

background : committment

‘If they are walking together, both Andrea herself and Heinrich will have the understandings so far described: by virtue of their walking together Andrea has a right to Heinrich’s continued walking alongside her, together with the standing to issue related rebukes and demands.’

(Gilbert, 2013, p. 25)

‘it is unclear how one’s own intention to pursue a goal amounts to a commitment to anyone besides oneself.’

(Roth, 2004, p. 371))

I think this is ridiculous (although lots do not; e.g. ‘We agree with Gilbert that joint action goes, intuitively, with the sort of joint commitment that she describes’ (Pettit & Schweikard, 2006, p. 32); also Helm endorses Gilbert).

‘Mightn’t one have a noncommittal attitude toward one’s walk with someone if, for example, one suspects that person might turn out to be irritable and unpleasant company?’

(Roth, 2004, p. 361)

Roth (2004, p. 361)

I think Roth is roughly right. The same is true concerning ordinary, individual intention. Yes, intention, unlike mere desire, involves commitment to act; but that commitment can be extremely fragile.
Gilbert is explicit about what grounds her theorising.

‘informal observation including self-observation’ and my ‘own sense of the matter’.

(Gilbert, 2014 pp. 24, 358)

So it seems that the debate between Gilbert and Bratman cannot easily be resolved.

1. Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments.

2. Having the intentions specified by Bratman’s Account would not entail having contralateral commitments.

3 An account of shared intention must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.

4. Therefore, Bratman’s Account is at best incomplete.

Bratman’s Account

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)