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Interface Problems and the Role of Experience

Two Interface Problems

execution (#1)

motor representations vs intentions✓

selection (#2)

primary motivational states vs preferences🐀

Experience is key ...

‘primary motivational states, such as hunger, do not determine the value of an instrumental goal directly;

rather, animals have to learn about the value of a commodity in a particular motivational state through direct experience with it in that state’

(Dickinson & Balleine, 1994, p. 7)
‘primary motivational states have no direct impact on the current value that an agent assigns to a past outcome of an instrumental action; rather, it appears that agents have to learn about the value of an outcome through direct experience with it, a process that we refer to as \emph{incentive learning}’
(Dickinson & Balleine, 1994, p. 8)

Dickinson & Balleine , 1994 p. 7

A role for experience in solving the interface problem.
change in preferences bodily response experience hunger + novel food

Why are rats (and you) aware of bodily states such as hunger and revulsion?

Because this awareness enables your preferences to be coupled,
but only losely,
to your primary motivational states.

Isn’t it redunant to have dissociable kinds of motivational state?

loose coupling

dual-process theories generally

‘the motivational control over goal-directed actions is, at least in part, indirect and mediated by learning about one's own reactions to primary incentives.

By this process [...], goal-directed actions are liberated from the tyranny of primary motivation’

(Dickinson & Balleine, 1994, p. 16)

Dickinson & Balleine , 1994 p. 16

Summary so far

Two (or more) kinds of motivatational state dissociate,

leading to an interface problem

that is solved by experience of our own bodily reactions.

But this was only one of the interface problems we encountered

can experience also play a role in solving other interface problems?

Two Interface Problems

execution (#1)

motor representation vs intention 🐀

selection (#2)

primary motivational states vs preferences ✓