Are Objections to Decision Theory also Objections to the Dual Process Theory of Action?

I said this before

This is what we are doing now.

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So this problem still stands in need of a solution.

Let me retrace my steps and explain as carefully as I can how it arises ...

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Repeats some of `what_are_preferences`

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What are these beliefs and desires? How exactly do they lead to actions? I suggested that we can appeal to decision theory for an answer to both questions.

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So it looks like we have solved the problem about what beliefs and desires are, and about how they predict actions.

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by ‘we’ I mean you.

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I wonder whether one or another form of non-expected utility theory could do the trick. E.g. cumulative prospect theory Tversky \& Kahneman (1992) is supposed to address, among others, Ellsberg’s insight about preferring different kinds of risk.

While I am not expert enough to make a judgement, I do not think it is satisfactory just to point to prospect theory.

As far as I can tell, this might be better at providing a description of how people tend to act.

But it does not seem like a candidate for providing an elucidation of belief and desire. Do those notions feature in prospect theory at all?

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Or, as a philosopher, you may be inclined to think that a formal model is too much.

I have much sympathy for this position. There is excellent reason to think that other notions likely to play a role in behavioural sciences cannot be given good formal models, for example knowledge (see Stalnaker, 1999 on the problem of logical opacity).

But, equally, we should recognize that having nothing to say about goal-directed processes is a problem. Philosophers sometimes underestimate this because they are mainly concerned with questions and the limits of understanding.

But scientifically we need a little more.

The informal characterisation of goal-directed processes has allowed us to distinguish them from habitual processes. So it is not that the informa characterisation is useless.

But it would be desirable to go further. To illustrate, goal-directed processes are found in a wide range of animal behaviours. It may be fruitful to distinguish more and less sophisticated forms of goal-directed process---perhaps there are multiple kinds of goal-directed process involved in a single action.

For instance, there is no role at all for intention in the goal-directed process as usually characterised. There does not seem to be a good way to introduce intention in terms of the informal characterisation we have. Will probably need a more rigorous approach.

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I said this before
Problem: how to characterize the goal-directed process such that we can
generate action predictions.
Candidate solution: the goal-directed process is the computation of expected
utility.
Objection: the goal-directed process does not compute expected utiltiy.
Illustration: Ellsberg Paradox
This is what we are doing now.
So this problem still stands in need of a solution.
Let me retrace my steps and explain as carefully as I can how it arises ...

habitual process

Action occurs in the presence of Stimulus.

Outcome follows action

Agent is rewarded

Stimulus-Action Link is strengthened due to reward

Given Stimulus, will Action occur? It depends on the strength of the Stimulus-Action Link.

‘goal-directed’ process

Action leads to Outcome.

Belief in Action-Outcome link is strengthened.

Agent has a Desire for the Outcome

Will Action occur? It depends on the Belief in the Action-Outcome Link and Agent’s Desire.

Repeats some of `what_are_preferences`

What are these beliefs and desires? How exactly do they lead to actions? I suggested that we can appeal to decision theory for an answer to both questions.

What are beliefs? And what are desires?
If you replace them with subjective probabilities and preferences,
this question is easy to answer:
they are constructs of decision theory.
How do beliefs and desires determine actions (or intentions)?
The agents’ subjective probabilities and preferences determine the expected
utilities of various actions she could take.
The agent selects the action with most expected utility.

habitual process

Action occurs in the presence of Stimulus.

Outcome follows action

Agent is rewarded

Stimulus-Action Link is strengthened due to reward

Given Stimulus, will Action occur? It depends on the strength of the Stimulus-Action Link.

‘goal-directed’ process

Action leads to Outcome.

Belief in Action-Outcome link is strengthened.

Agent has a Desire for the Outcome

Will Action occur? It depends on the Belief in the Action-Outcome Link and Agent’s Desire.

So it looks like we have solved the problem about what beliefs and desires are, and about how they predict actions.

What should we do?
by ‘we’ I mean you.
option 1: find a way to hold on to decision theory despite the objections
option 2: find an alternative formalization 
(cumulative prospect theory Tversky & Kahneman, 1992?)
I wonder whether one or another form of non-expected utility theory
could do the trick.  E.g. cumulative prospect theory Tversky & Kahneman (1992)
is supposed to address, among others, Ellsberg’s insight about preferring
different kinds of risk.
While I am not expert enough to make a judgement, I do not think it is 
satisfactory just to point to prospect theory.
As far as I can tell, this might be better at providing a description
of how people tend to act.
But it does not seem like a candidate for providing an elucidation
of belief and desire. Do those notions feature in prospect theory at all?
option 3: find an informal way to characterise these processes
Or, as a philosopher, you may be inclined to think that a formal model 
is too much.
I have much sympathy for this position. There is excellent reason to think
that other notions likely to play a role in behavioural sciences cannot 
be given good formal models, for example knowledge 
(see Stalnaker, 1999 on the problem of logical opacity).
But, equally, we should recognize that having nothing to say about 
goal-directed processes is a problem. 
Philosophers sometimes underestimate this because they are mainly
concerned with questions and the limits of understanding.
But scientifically we need a little more.
The informal characterisation of goal-directed processes has allowed
us to distinguish them from habitual processes.
So it is not that the informa characterisation is useless.
But it would be desirable to go further. 
To illustrate, goal-directed processes are found in a wide range of animal
behaviours.
It may be fruitful to distinguish more and less
sophisticated forms of goal-directed process---perhaps there are multiple
kinds of goal-directed process involved in a single action.
For instance, there is no role at all for intention in the goal-directed
process as usually characterised.
There does not seem to be a good way to introduce intention in terms of
the informal characterisation we have. Will probably need a more rigorous
approach.

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