Dual Process Theory Opposes Decision Theory?

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Dual Process Theory Opposes Decision Theory?

habitual process

Action occurs in the presence of Stimulus.

Agent is rewarded [/punished]

Stimulus-Action Link is strengthened [/weakened] due to reward [/punishment]

Given Stimulus, will Action occur? It depends on the strength of the Stimulus-Action Link.

‘goal-directed’ process

Action leads to Outcome.

Belief in Action-Outcome link is strengthened.

Agent has a Desire for the Outcome

Will Action occur? It depends on the Belief in the Action-Outcome Link and Agent’s Desire.

What are these beliefs and desires? How exactly do they lead to actions? I suggested that we can appeal to decision theory for an answer to both questions.

I suggested that we take game theory as elucidating the goal-directed process.

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

key assumption:

Agents’ actions maximise their expected utilities.

If we understand this as instrumental action, we run into a problem.

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

key assumption:

Agents’ actions maximise their expected utilities.

If we understand this as instrumental action, we run into a problem ...

habitual process

Action occurs in the presence of Stimulus.

Agent is rewarded [/punished]

Stimulus-Action Link is strengthened [/weakened] due to reward [/punishment]

Given Stimulus, will Action occur? It depends on the strength of the Stimulus-Action Link.

‘goal-directed’ process

Action leads to Outcome.

Belief in Action-Outcome link is strengthened.

Agent has a Desire for the Outcome

Will Action occur? It depends on the Belief in the Action-Outcome Link and Agent’s Desire.

Not all of the processes which influence action are processes that maximise expected utilties.

After all, there are habitual processes.

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

key assumption:

Agents’ actions maximise their expected utilities.

So this is the objection. Agents’ actions do not actually maximise their expected utilties.

response 1

‘the laws of decision theory (or any other theory of rationality) are not empirical generalisations about all agents. What they do is define what is meant ... by being rational’

(Davidson, 1987, p. 43)

but: elucidation was our goal

This is maybe fine if you want to use decision theory like that.

But we wanted to use it to elucidate states which play a role in a theory that offers a causal explanation of action.

So this response really just conceeds the objection.

But this is important because it shows that ...

We are not objecting to decision theory.

We are objecting to a particular construal of it (as an elucidation).

response 2

It’s an approximation; the details don’t matter.

This is tempting because habitual processes will tend, when things to well, to maximise expected utilities.

We might even see game theory as characterising what the habitual processes are a shortcut to achieving.

but: prediction vs elucidation

This might be a fine response if we were using decision theory to predicting behaviour.

Sometimes you gain predictive power by abstracting from messy impelementation details.

And **seen from the outside**, agents will likely behave much as if they were maximising their expected utiltities.

But our aim was to elucidate the notions of belief and desire as they feature in an explanation of action. To do that, we have to identify them with the theoretical constructs of decision theory.

So this second response also really just conceeds the objection. It distracts us by pointing to other applications of decision theory. But we were not objecting that decision theory has no other applications. We were objecting to a specific application of it.

response 3

What maximises expected utility are not actions but goal-directed processes.

This is the most interesting line of response I know. It offers a substantial change to the construal of decision theory but also attempts to avoid the objection.

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

key assumption:

Agents’ actions goal-directed processes maximise their expected utilities.

habitual process

Action occurs in the presence of Stimulus.

Agent is rewarded [/punished]

Stimulus-Action Link is strengthened [/weakened] due to reward [/punishment]

Given Stimulus, will Action occur? It depends on the strength of the Stimulus-Action Link.

‘goal-directed’ process

Action leads to Outcome.

Belief in Action-Outcome link is strengthened.

Agent has a Desire for the Outcome

Will Action occur? It depends on the Belief in the Action-Outcome Link and Agent’s Desire.

problem now is that preferences feature twice in the scheme of things!

Is the preference that dictates the reward the same or different?

Concerning the habitual process, what makes outcomes rewarding?

possibility 1:

possibility 2:

Each has potential problems.

possibility 2: now it looks like the two processes might pull in different directions. What if anything ensures that they are not fighting against each other in the way that people with different preferences might? (My habitual processes love bananas and hate chocolate ...)

possibility 1: if this is right, decision theory did not provide a full elucidation of the notion of preference. So we have discovered something substantial: decision theory provides at most a partical elucidation. And it is unclear how to develop the elucidation further.

conclusion so far

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

The dual-process theory of instrumental action, if true, complicates Jeffry’s claim that decision theory provides an elucidation of these notions.

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Dual Process Theory Opposes Decision Theory?

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