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Could Motor Representations Ground Collective Goals?

In virtue of what could two or more agents’ actions have a collective goal?

Recall how Ayesha takes a glass and holds it up while Beatrice pours prosecco; and unfortunately the prosecco misses the glass, soaking Zachs’s trousers. Ayesha might say, truthfully, ‘The collective goal of our actions was not to soak Zach's trousers in sparkling wine but only to fill this glass.’ What could make Ayesha’s statement true?
light
smoke
drop
throw
discard
amuse
scare
freak out
block
shared intention
or i.a.s.m.r.
coordinates
represents
As this illustrates, some actions involving multiple agents are purposive in the sense that
among all their actual and possible consequences,
there are outcomes to which they are directed
and the actions are collectively directed to this outcome
so it is not just a matter of each individual action being directed to this outcome.
In such cases we can say that the actions have a collective goal.
As what Ayesha and Beatrice are doing---filling a glass together---is a paradigm case of joint action, it might seem natural to answer the question by invoking a notion of shared (or `collective') intention. Suppose Ayesha and Beatrice have a shared intention that they fill the glass. Then, on many accounts of shared intention,
the shared intention involves each of them intending that they, Ayesha and Beatrice, fill the glass; or each of them being in some other state which picks out this outcome.
The shared intention also provides for the coordination of their actions (so that, for example, Beatrice doesn't start pouring until Ayesha is holding the glass under the bottle). And coordination of this type would normally facilitate occurrences of the type of outcome intended. In this way, invoking a notion of shared intention provides one answer to our question about what it is for some actions to be collectively directed to an outcome.
Are there also ways of answering the question which involve psychological structures other than shared intention? In what follows I shall draw on recent discoveries about how multiple agents coordinate their actions to argue that the collective directedness of some actions to an outcome can be explained in terms of a particular interagential structure of motor representations.
Our actions having collective goals is not always only a matter of what we intend: sometimes it constitutively involves motor representation.
a clue: when agents perform joint actions, motor representation concerning a partner’s action can occur.

a clue:

motor representations concerning
another’s actions occur in joint action

An important clue as to how we might be in the ‘we mode’ is provided by some experimental data concerning motor representation in joint action ...

Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich (2013)

The CNV, an event-related potential, is a signal of motor preparation for action which is time-locked to action onset. In this research, Kourtis et al show
that the CNV occurs when joint action partners act, suggesting that when acting together we represent others' actions motorically as well as our own, and also that the stronger CNV peak is correlated with better coordination (Kourtis et al., 2013);
and in earlier research they show, roughly, that a stronger CNV occurs in relation to actions of others one is engaged in joint action than in relation to actions of others one is merely observing (Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010).

Kourtis et al. (2013)

Kourtis et al. (2013, p. figure 5)

‘the (motor) CNV of a “receiver” peaked approximately at the time of the partner’s response. This suggests that in the receiving 610 condition participants were not only preparing their own actions but also sampling the average speed their partner took to initiate the giving action. This, in turn, allowed them to predict the time their partner would take to initiate the giving action on a given trial.’ (Kourtis et al., 2013, p. 9)
‘there was a significant correlation between the receiver’s motor CNV amplitude and the improvement in coordination. The behavioral analysis clearly showed that the speed-up in receiving led to the improvement in coordination as receiving was getting faster at a greater rate than giving. This finding can be well explained by the assumption that motor simulation allowed the receiver 655 to predict the timing of the giver’s action and to improve coordination by decreasing the asynchrony in action onset between initiating the giving and receiv- ing action.’ (Kourtis et al., 2013, p. 9)

Kourtis, Knoblich, Woźniak, & Sebanz (2014, p. figure 1c)

I think we're a long way from having a large body of converging evidence for this conjecture, but there is some that points in this direction. One of the most relevant experiments is this one by Kourtis et al. (2014).
They contrasted a simple joint action involving two agents clinking glasses.
The CNV is a signal of motor preparation for action which is time-locked to action onset. In previous research, Kourtis et al show (i) that the CNV occurs when joint action partners act, suggesting that when acting together we represent others' actions motorically as well as our own (Kourtis et al., 2013); and (ii) (roughly) a stronger CNV occurs in relation to actions of others one is engaged in joint action than in relation to actions of others one is merely observing (Kourtis et al., 2010).
Kourtis et al hypothesised that in actions like clinking glasses, A single outcome represented is motorically, which triggers planning-like processes concerning all the agents' actions. This leads to the prediction that the CNV in joint action will resemble that occurring in bimanual action more than that occuring in unimanual action.

Kourtis et al. (2014, p. figure 4a)

... and this is exactly what they found.

Ramenzoni et al, 2014 figure 1

Importantly there is converging evidence for the involvement of motor representation concerning a partner’s action in joint action from studies which use behavioural measures ... Joint performance is better when observing joint actors; individual performance when observing individual actors.

Ramenzoni et al, 2014 figure 1

Ramenzoni et al, 2014 figure 1

So once again we are forced to ask,

What are those motor representations doing here?

Conjecture:

Collective goals are represented motorically.

Prediction 1 (della Gatta et al., 2017):

Framing two agents’ simultaneous unimanual actions as joint can induce effects similar to bimanual coupling.

Prediction 2 (Sacheli et al., 2018):

Framing two agents’ sequential actions as a joint action modulates the effects of ‘incongruent’ actions.

Sacheli et al, 2018 figure 2 (part)

Sacheli et al, 2018 figure 5

[Skip -- just in case anyone asks]

Sacheli et al, 2018 figure 3

Conjecture:

Collective goals are represented motorically.

Prediction 1 (della Gatta et al, 2017):

Framing two agents’ simultaneous unimanual actions as joint can induce effects similar to bimanual coupling.

Prediction 2 (Sacheli et al):

Framing two agents’ sequential actions as a joint action modulates the effects of ‘incongruent’ actions.

Some of more recent work goes further: Sacheli, Arcangeli, Carioti, Butterfill, & Berlingeri (2022)

In virtue of what could two or more agents’ actions have a collective goal?

Recall how Ayesha takes a glass and holds it up while Beatrice pours prosecco; and unfortunately the prosecco misses the glass, soaking Zachs’s trousers. Ayesha might say, truthfully, ‘The collective goal of our actions was not to soak Zach's trousers in sparkling wine but only to fill this glass.’ What could make Ayesha’s statement true?
light
smoke
drop
throw
discard
amuse
scare
freak out
block
shared intention
or i.a.s.m.r.
coordinates
represents
problem of action problem of joint action we do need shared intention Bratman's planning theory Pacherie's team reason- ing theory collective goals we don't need shared intention dyadic motor plans we do need intention motor representa- tion habitual processes we don't need intention } }

joint action

What is the relation between a joint action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is collectively directed?

Could motor representations also ground this relation?

ordinary, individual action

What is the relation between an instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

Motor representations ground this relation.

individual action

joint action

intentions
vs motor representations of outcomes

shared intentions
vs motor representations of collective goals

Nonstandard Solutions

An action is an event that is appropriately related to a motor representation.

A joint action is an event that is appropriately related to some motor representations of a collective goal.

Compare objection to Standard Solution to The Problem of Action

Objection 2 (individual)

The Problem of Action

Invoking motor representations yields a solution that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

Objection 2 (joint)

The Problem of Joint Action

Invoking motor representations of collective goals yields a solution that is no worse than one which involves invoking Shared Intention.

I’m also picking up where we left off two lectures ago, but I will not asssume that you remember this so I will drop that part.

plan (from lecture 07)

1. What is the relation between a very small scale instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

2. How, if at all, does answering this question challenge the Standard Answer to the Problem of Action?

3. Is there a parallel set of issues concerning joint action?

1. Solve the Problem of Action.

2. Identify a role for motor representation in joint action.